Diversity as an Epistemic Value

The paper presents the role of diversity in ensuring the objectivity of scientific research as understood in recent ‘values in science’ debates within philosophy of science. Along with traditional epistemic values, i.e. values that promote the attainment of truth, such as accuracy and consistency, the new picture of desirable epistemic values includes diversity as an indispensable indicator of critical scrutiny which is not only beneficial for the goal of attaining knowledge, but also for the goal of attaining social justice. Objectivity is in this new understanding achieved through diversity and inclusion of different perspectives open to mutual criticism. Diversity as a safeguard against individual and group biases is especially acknowledged in its critical role by feminist contributions to philosophy of science.

The paper starts by introducing the focus of philosophy of science in general and values in science debates in particular, followed by an overview of standard accounts of epistemic and non-epistemic values and their often conflicting roles in decision making in science. Subsequently, the benefits of diversity are discussed and exemplified by Anke Bueter’s case study (Bueter, 2015) on female health research. Several normative ideals for science are put forward and certain problems and solutions of each are outlined.